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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V • I 
LYNN L. BELT, 1 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
t Case No. 880169-CA 
i Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of theft 
by receiving, a second and third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-408 (Supp. 1988), following a jury trial in 
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) 
and S 77-35-26(b)(l) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1• Whether defendant was entrapped as a matter of law? 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying 
defendant's motion for mistrial as the result of the jury having 
heard evidence concerning defendant's offer to Sgt. Illsley to 
obtain a controlled substance and the trial court's subsequent 
ruling, following the State's case in chief, that the evidence was 
insufficient to submit the charge to the jury. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
defendant'8 convictions of theft by receiving. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lynn L. Belt, was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of theft by receiving, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-408 (Supp. 1987) on October 15, 1987, in Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1986, the Metro Major Felony Unit of the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force, of which Sgt. Charles Illsley was a 
member, estabished an undercover operation involving, among other 
things, the purchase and sale of stolen property (T. 6-7). As 
part of the operation, the officers established an Hundercover 
house" equipped with audio and video recording devices, at which 
part of the transactions took place (T. 43). 
On March 4, 1986, while at a Dee's Restaurant on 21st 
South and Redwood Road, Sgt. Illsley observed defendant sitting 
with Galen Jones, a person involved in stolen property 
trafficking (T. 8). Sgt. Illsley did speak with defendant at 
that time (T. 8). 
In June 1986, Sgt. Illsley again saw defendant at the 
Dee's Restaurant (T. 9). After Illsley had been on the phone for 
a period of time, he walked up to defendant, who was standing 
near the counter, and told him that he "wished Galen would get a 
phone" because it was difficult to reach him during nights and 
weekends (T. 9). Defendant made no response and no further 
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his car which he had previously purchased for $299. (T. 20-21). 
As defendant passed Illsley on his way to the cash register, 
defendant waved and said hello (T. 23). After defendant left the 
restaurant, Illsley approached defendant outside and told him he 
had a video recorder still in the box (T. 23). Defendant asked 
how much he wanted for it and Illsley told him $100 (T. 23). 
They discussed the quality of the VCR and then moved their 
vehicles further into the parking lot (T. 24). Defendant looked 
in Illsley's trunk at the VCR; Illsley pointed out the places on 
the box from which the serial numbers had been cut out and told 
him he "got it off a truck, and there wouldn't be a problem with 
it" (T. 24). Illsley also told him he had three more VCRs 
available and asked defendant if he were interested (T. 25). 
Defendant instructed Illsley to call him at home and told him his 
number was in the book under Lynn Belt (T. 25). Defendant paid 
$100 for the VCR and left. 
On July 20, Sgt. Illsley spoke to defendant on the 
telephone for the first time and asked him to meet for coffee; 
they agreed on a place and time and met at Dee's at 10 p.m. that 
night (T. 28, 33, 91). Illsley drove into the parking lot and 
defendant walked to Illsley's car (T. 33). Defendant told 
Illsley he had waited for him to call yesterday (T. 34). Illsley 
suggested driving to the end of the parking lot; defendant 
responded that there was Na million people around" and suggested 
that they go for a drive (T. 34). Illsley followed defendant to 
a location several blocks away and parked in an empty parking lot 
by the Deseret Industries located on Industrial Road (T. 35-36). 
-4-
IJIJeie;1! - lh • I t h r e e V'LINiii liii IJI I H c a r r f o r w h i c h hi.' hail pa hi 
approx imate ly $1200 i I i I ' i He t u l d de fendant he wanted 
" t h r e e In i 1 1 B " f o r t h r 1 11 nil i Hot e m i t ml ufii'iii I IIIIIIIMI 11111 111 I m i l i 
I in in« iii i in in mi iiLi'ii uugii IIIIII in Bft iu, i iifliut il in i nil I i me t H i d i n g u u n y s 
.i'1. "i speeding" (T I , j u v e h l r $1(1 a n d l o a d e d t h e V^Lu 
i n t o In I  > I i* mi I ("i« I I IIIIII ) I1 n I I 1  n I e» » i i« f f i i e< I I 11 i in I I III I I R , 
h< L'i .1 d e f e n d a n t t h a t Hie i - t e i e uain*»h und B e i i a i ntinibe I I 
b e e n c u t of I ; d e f e n d a n t I P I I I U I I , I d e n I want t o h e a r iill ill t h e 
B P r i ai 1 numbe i i i 111 I  i I  i i in i" 1111 1 I 11111 I II11
 ( 11111 m 111II 111 n i I i I i I I i c u r 
b u s i r i e s f a • | 1  . IB-J9 ) l i e i e u d a i i l a n d l i l s l e y d i s c u s s e d p o s s i b l e 
f u t u r e t r a n s a c t i o n s ; d e f e n d a n t t o i d him h e w HUH l o o k i n g f o r a 
v i dpi "pm< I . it.s I . t « i fa . | , 
J 1 ' ' lie fe ik l I J l s I e y t h a t h e h a d " c h e c k e d | l IHI] o u t w i t h G a l e n " 
aiiiJ t h a t i f h e " w e r e n ' t : a J'I lenrl o f G a l e n r s " h e w o u l d n o t h 
I I I I mi mi I 11 1 Ii in III  | I I i | 1  I I h I i \t I ii I i I ilh1 i ei id ii III I I h e r e wutikl i i I 
b e a n y h e a t on any o t t h i s s t i l l I a n d t h a t t h e r e w o u l d nu t " b e 
any h e a t e v e r on a n y t h 11111 m i « 11 i ft t t h f • n n ri h e 
I I  HI I I h i i 1 IN III I I  IHIIPJI a ih llh M I i l u i e i i d a n t wliiii Ii d u e i . . « < K e 
l e a v i n g , a n d llh I I d im h e wnul i l l e n v e i n t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n 
( T \ 4 0 ) . 
Sin I 1  I I H I i j Ii Il 1  i i o n l a c t « " t h d e f e n d a n t on 
J u l y 2 3 , 1986 ( I , 4 i | i l l B l e y t e l e p h o n e d d e f e n d a n t a t h i s h o u s e 
ani l t o l d d e f e n d a n t tie s h o u l d c a l l I'm i HI b«iek f i i HH n |iAy [IIIIIIM1 I T . 
4 I in 111 <i-el ui iii.ll ami l ILOIIIJIJI IIIIKII I H I 1 BIIIIIJ l, h e y made a r r a n g e m e n t s In 
n e e a t t h e u n d e r c o v e r h o u s e (T <H i I'I i n r t o d e f e n d a n t " in e n t r y 
i n t o t he h o u s e r S g t . 1 I I n 1  i^' in I i leit m ill I lh i i in em d I ni | ili-iv m i e« | '"II 
Ji i "ill! I MIL O i J l i j e t t ml I lie t i a n s a c t i o n was a IY IIIIII In I IH I e v i s i o n 
which Sgt. Illsley had purchased for $299 (T. 53). The video and 
audio tapes depicting the transaction were played for the jury 
(T. 51). 
During the transaction, defendant told Sgt. Illsley 
that he would be able to provide him with "crank," a street name 
for methamphetamine which is a schedule II controlled substance, 
and quoted prices for various amounts of the substance (T. 54, 
57). During subsequent telephone calls, Sgt. Illsley and 
defendant discussed the drug transaction and on July 25, 
defendant told him the deal was off (T. 58-59). Defendant told 
Illsley that the person who was going to supply the drugs did not 
have enough available at that time and he would get back with him 
to find out when the drugs would be available (T. 59). 
During the July 23 meeting, Sgt. Illsley told defendant 
that the TV was too big to fit in his Camaro and that he did not 
want to get "pulled over by the cops" with the TV in his car (T. 
59). He also told defendant that the serial numbers had been cut 
off; defendant replied that he was not worried and said, "Let 
them go ahead and pull me over. They don't have the serial 
number" (T. 59). Defendant told Illsley that, "If you were a 
cop, you would have had me by now anyway" and said that he 
understood that Illsley "boostfs] this stuff" (T. 59). When 
Illsley started to explain, defendant said, "I don't want to know 
what you are doing" (T. 59-60). Defendant also told Illsley not 
to cut the serial numbers off because it "makes it look hot" and 
to, instead, just scrape the information off so it could not be 
read. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT HE WAS ENTRAPPED. 
Defendant claims that he was entrapped into committing 
the crimes and that his convictions should be reversed. 
Entrapment may be a defense to a crime and occurs: 
when a law enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in co-operation with 
the officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303(1) (1978). 
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979), the 
Supreme Court held that in reviewing an entrapment defense the 
test used to determine entrapment is an objective one where Hthe 
focus is not on the propensities and predisposition of the 
specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct revealed in 
the particular case falls below standards, to which common 
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.H 
Defendant relies on four Utah cases that illustrate 
police conduct that "falls below standards . . . for proper use 
of governmental powers." Taylor at 500. A brief review of the 
facts in those cases illustrates why none supports reversal in 
the present case. In Taylor, the government agent involved was a 
heroin addict who was also a former lover and someone who was 
still a close friend of the defendant. The defendant was also a 
-8-
heroin addict who had previously used heroin with the agent on 
numerous occasions. The agent pleaded with the defendant to get 
her heroin because she was experiencing severe withdrawal 
symptoms. 
In State v. Bridwellf 566 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1977), a 
close friend of the defendant who was in trouble with the law 
teamed up with a police officer to buy marijuana from the 
defendant. The defendant did not want to be involved with drugs 
anymore, but sold to the officer after defendant's friend had 
been working the defendant over on trying to make a "buy" for at 
least a month, ^d. at 1235-6. 
In State v. Spraque, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), two 
undercover officers approached the defendant to buy marijuana 
even though neither officer knew the defendant or had any reason 
to believe he sold or even used drugs. Over a two week period, 
the officers approached the defendant three separate times, once 
at defendant's place of employment. On the first two occasions, 
the defendant did not make any attempt to get marijuana for the 
officers and did not initiate contact with the officer. Finally, 
on the third approach, the defendant procured a very small amount 
of marijuana for the officer. 
Lastly, in State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), 
an officer represented herself as an attractive, divorced woman 
with six children to support and in need of money. The Court 
held that in that situation, the officer was -not just selling 
stolen merchandise, but was selling herself as an attractive, 
relatively young, divorced mother of six children who was having 
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hard times.H Jto. at 468. Consequently/ this enticed the 
defendant into an interest in more than a business relationship 
with the officer and as a result "the offenses committed were not 
the product of the defendant's initiative or desire, but were 
induced by the conduct of the undercover officer." Id.. The 
Court suggested that had the officer been a man or unattractive 
woman, thereby removing the personal enticements involved in the 
case, there might well have been no entrapment. 
The present case can be distinguished on its facts. In 
the cases relied upon by defendant, the officers went well beyond 
"merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense. 
. ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1978). However, in the 
present case, "affording an opportunity" for defendant to commit 
the crimes was, without more, what Sgt. Illsley did. That 
defendant took advantage of the opportunity to his detriment is 
his misfortune, but is not, as a matter of law, entrapment. This 
is clearly shown by an overview of the facts. 
During the first sale, Sgt. Illsley simply presented 
defendant an opportunity by showing him three television sets in 
a restaurant parking lot and asking him to "tell Galen I have 
these" (T. 16). Defendant expressed interest in buying them and 
after being told that the serial numbers had been peeled off and 
that there wouldn't be any hassle on the televisions, defendant 
bought them (T. 18)* Prior to the purchase, even defendant's 
wife, who was present in the area but not privy to the 
conversation between defendant and Illsley, expressed concern 
over whether they were stolen (T. 126). 
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During the second "buy," the officer again merely told 
defendant that he had a brand new VCR for sale for $100. 
Defendant and Sgt. Illsley drove to the end of the parking lot to 
make the sale. During this time, the officer told defendant that 
he had "got it off a truck, and there wouldn't be any problem 
with it" (T. 24). This remark clearly suggested that the VCR was 
stolen. Sgt. Illsley told defendant that he had three more VCRs 
and asked him if he was interested in buying them. Defendant 
instructed the officer to call him and told him his phone number 
was in the book under the name Lynn Belt (T. 25). 
For the third sale, Sgt. Illsley, at defendant's 
request, called him and arranged the sale of the three VCRs. 
Defendant met Officer Illsley at Dee's Restaurant and after 
observing a "million" people determined that the deal should be 
done elsewhere. Illsley followed defendant to a more secluded 
place several blocks away and completed the sale (T. 34, 201). 
During the transaction, defendant specifically requested a video 
camera and expressed interest in a television (T. 38, 39). 
Defendant also told Sgt. Illsley that he had "checked [him] out 
with Galen" (T. 39). This statement along with other statements 
made later strongly suggest that defendant was "checking with 
Galen" to see if Illsley was a police officer. This clearly 
suggests a knowledge by defendant that the items were either 
stolen properly or property being represented as stolen for the 
purpose of a police "string" operation. Finally, Illsley told 
defendant there would not be any "heat" on the items (T. 40), 
which must be construed to mean that the police weren't looking 
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for the items. An item that is not stolen does not need 
assurances that there will be no "heat." 
The last transaction took place at the police 
-undercover pad" and was videotaped. The tapes clearly reveal 
that the television sold at that time and the past items were 
represented as stolen and that the defendant understood them to 
be stolen. This is clear from Sgt. Illsley's statement that the 
television was -too big to get into the Camero and that [he] 
didn't want to get pulled over by the cops- (T. 59), his 
statement clearly indicates trouble if the police were to check 
out the television. Defendant replied that he did not care if 
the cops pulled him over because they didn't have the serial 
numbers (T. 59). Sgt. Illsley also informed defendant that the 
merchandise was -off the dock, that they didn't even know it was 
missing and there wouldn't be any heat on him" (T. 60). However, 
most telling as to whether Sgt. Illsley had represented that the 
items were stolen is defendant's own statement recorded on tape 
and related by Illsley that, -If you were a cop, you would have 
had me by now anyway- (T. 59). This clearly shows that defendant 
suspected that these sales were part of a police -sting" 
operation but had decided, apparently by checking with Galen, 
that these were instead really stolen items and that Illsley was 
the thief. 
To apprehend persons who engage in illegal business 
activities, such as dealing in narcotics or stolen properly, it 
has long been recognized that the police must use deceptive 
methods. In State v. Bridwell, 566 P.2d 1232, 1233 (Utah 1977), 
the Court, quoting the trial judge, stated: 
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This is not an easy type of case. It is 
not easy for the law enforcement people who 
are out there trying to take care of the 
types of things that the people, the citizens 
of this community, are demanding that they 
take care of, and doing it the best way they 
can. And in this narcotics area, that is not 
easy. It's not easy. 
I think it's very clear that, you know, 
it's not like a person who is dealing in 
narcotics goes out and solicits his wares, 
solicits purchases in the community like 
other merchants do; I mean, these are covert 
operations. And so the police and the 
sheriff use covert methods in order to 
attempt to bring these things to a halt. 
In State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1980), 
this concept was reiterated when the Court stated that "[i]t is 
well known that, due to the secretive nature of trafficking in 
drugs, it is common practice to use undercover agents to 
investigate such activity. Unless there is an abuse of 
imposition, that procedure is recognized as legitimate." These 
principles also apply to apprehending those who deal in stolen 
merchandise, which by its covert nature shares the same problems 
that exist in apprehending drug dealers. 
In this case, defendant contends that police procedures 
were improper and that Sgt. Illsley overreached when he phoned 
defendant to set up the third and fourth transactions and by not 
telling defendant directly that the goods were stolen. However, 
as shown by the facts of this case, the phone calls from Illsley 
were made at defendant's request. Further, in reviewing the 
testimony concerning the phone calls, the evidence is 
inconsistent. Defendant's wife claims that the phone calls 
started a few days after the first transaction and that Illsley 
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called Mnearly 20 or 30 calls in all" (T. 128). Defendant's 
daughter claims the phone calls started three or four days after 
the first transaction and that there was four or five calls a day 
for a couple of weeks, about 15 calls in all (T. 137-38). 
Defendant stated that no phone calls occurred until about ten 
days after the first transaction (T. 197). Finally, Sgt. Illsley 
stated that he looked up defendant's phone number in the phone 
book on defendant's instruction after the second transaction to 
set up the third sale for three VCRs that defendant had indicated 
he wanted to buy (T. 25). Out of 17 phone calls between 
defendant and Sgt. Illsley, the officer initiated 14; however, 
none of these phone calls had been made for the purpose of 
attracting defendant into making the purchase. His desire to do 
so had already been established by both the officer's and 
defendant's testimony (T. 25r 200). These phone calls were 
merely to set up the time and place for the purchase. As such 
they cannot be construed as overreaching in an attempt to coerce 
defendant into an illegal act. In these transactions, defendant 
needed no coercion. 
In regard to the second argument that Sgt. Illsley did 
not convey that the items were stolen and therefore defendant was 
entrapped, the facts show that Sgt. Illsley indirectly but very 
clearly conveyed to defendant that the items were stolen and 
further the defendant clearly understood them to be stolen. It 
is common practice when dealing in stolen property that the word 
"stolen" is not directly used (T. 102). There are no grounds 
upon which defendant can claim that he was entrapped and 
defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO 
DECLARE A MISTRIAL AFTER IT DISMISSED THE 
CHARGE OF OFFERING TO SELL A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOLLOWING 
THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
Defendant was charged in Count V of the information 
with offering, agreeing, or arranging to distribute for value a 
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8-
(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1988). Following the presentation of the 
State's case in chief, upon motion of defendant, the trial court 
dismissed the count. Defendant then moved for a mistrial 
claiming that he had been prejudiced as a result of the 
presentation of the evidence that he had offered to sell a 
controlled substance to Sgt. Illsley. 
Count V was properly included in the information along 
with Counts I through IV. Rule 9(a), Utah R. Crim.P., provides: 
Two or more offenses may be charged in the 
same indictment or information in a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses 
charged arise out of a criminal episode as 
defined in section 76-1-401. 
Rule 9(d) provides that: 
If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment or 
information, or by a joinder for trial 
together, the court shall order an election 
of separate trials of separate counts, or 
grant a severance of defendants, or provide 
such other relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of 
offenses or defendants is waived if the 
motion is not made at least five days before 
trial* . . • 
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Had defendant thought that the presentation of evidence 
in regard to Count V would prejudice the jury in regard to Counts 
I through IV, he should have requested relief pursuant to Rule 
9(d). Defendant instead did nothing in regard to possible 
prejudice until after the evidence on Count V was admitted and 
the State had rested its case. The trial court granted the 
defense motion to dismiss Count V but did not declare a mistrial. 
Having failed to pursue this issue in a timely fashion, defendant 
has waived his right to claim prejudice stemming from the 
evidence elicited in regard to Count V. 
In State v. Johnf 667 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Utah 1983), a 
similar situation occurred and the Court stated that: 
the defendant raised no question of 
irregularity . . . at pretrial by motion to 
suppress and hence had waived such claimed 
error. Nor did the defendant make any timely 
objection to the evidence at trial as 
required under the "contemporaneous 
objection" rule. The only objection before 
appeal was made a day after the testimony 
claimed to have been prejudicial was given 
and after the prosecution had rested. 
In the present case, the only objection prior to appeal 
was in the form of defendant's oral motion for mistrial which was 
made a day after the testimony claimed to be prejudicial was 
given and after the State had rested (T. 113, 53-55). 
Consequently, any right to question the introduction of this 
evidence has been waived. 
Additionally, there was no undue prejudice as a result 
of the introduction of this evidence. In State v. Bundyf 684 
P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court held that *[t]o 
successfully claim prejudicial error, the defendant must show 
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that there is a reasonable likelihood that absent [the testimony] 
the jury would have returned a different verdict" (citing State 
v, Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant has not made such a showing. Further, there 
is no reason to assume that the information in regard to Count V 
in any way affected the jury decision for two reasons. First, 
defendant's use of "speed" (a street name similar to "crank" or 
"crystal" for methamphetamine) was introduced to the jury prior 
to the evidence specific to Count V (T. 37). Officer Illsley 
testified that while paying for the three VCRs, defendant stated, 
"I have a hard time finding things when I'm speeding" (T. 37). 
Secondly, the jury was aware that defendant had at 
least some prior criminal legal difficulties in that on the video 
tape shown at trial defendant discussed the fact that he was out 
on "appeal bond." Defendant expressly waived his right to have 
the mention of his appeal bond deleted from the tape (T. 50). 
Consequently, given the fact that the jury was aware that 
defendant used "speed" and had prior problems with the law, it is 
improbable that they convicted him of Counts III and IV because 
of the evidence presented to support Count V. It is more likely, 
given what they already knew, that this evidence had little or no 
bearing on the jury verdict. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF TWO COUNTS OF THEFT BY 
RECEIVING. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the 
Supreme Court set-forth the standard for reversing a criminal 
conviction on insufficient evidence: 
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We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted (citations omitted). 
This standard was further clarified in State v. Lamm, 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980), which held that "[i]t is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and it is not within 
the prerogative of this Court to substitute its judgment for that 
of the fact finder.- Finally, in State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah 1978), the Court held that for the defendant to 
successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 
his conviction, he must show Hwhen viewing the evidence and all 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could 
not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (citations 
omitted). 
Defendant has not met his burden in this case. As 
defendant admits, there was a difference of opinion in the 
definition Sgt. Illsley and defendant had for the word "boosted," 
which the officer defined as "shoplifting" and the defendant 
defined as "stealing." (T. 60, 101, 206.) In addition, 
defendant stated that Sgt. Illsley told him that these items were 
overage off the dock (T. 199, 200, 202). However, Sgt. Illsley 
specifically denied having made such a statement (T. 230). 
To make defendant think the items were stolen, Sgt. 
Illsley stated that he told defendant that the items were "off a 
•18-
truck- (T. 24), that there would be -no heat- on the items (T. 
24# 40)# and that "no one would know it was missing- (T. 60). 
Sgt. Illsley cut out the store names and serial numbers to make 
the items look stolen. 
While defendant claims to not have known the items were 
stolen, it is clear that a number of other people suspected that 
they were stolen, including his wife (T. 126), his son-in-law (T. 
145), his friend of 30 years, Richard Jewkes (T. 169), and his 
cousin, Doyle Harris (T. 184). However, most damaging to 
defendant's claim that he did not know other items were stolen 
are his own statements which clearly evidence he believed the 
items were stolen. Defendant on several occasions expressed his 
desire not to know where the items came from (T. 60, 205). When 
Sgt. Illsley expressed a reluctance to getting pulled over by 
police with the television in his car, defendant expressed that 
he was not concerned because "they don't have the serial numbers" 
(T. 59). Finally, defendant stated, on video tape, that, "If you 
were going to get me, if you were a cop, you'd a had me by now" 
(Exhibit 31, T. 59). This statement clearly shows that he 
believed the items were stolen. 
On this evidence, the jury found that defendant 
believed the items to be stolen and convicted him on Counts III 
and IV of theft by receiving. It should be noted that the jury 
did not convict on Counts I and II, indicating that they took 
care in coming to their guilty verdicts. By the standards the 
Supreme Court established in Petree, it is clear that the 
evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of 
theft by receiving. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant, Lynn L. Belt, was properly convicted of two 
counts of theft by receiving. For the foregoing reasons, as well 
as any additional arguments made at the time of oral argument, 
the State requests this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
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